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Non–technical Summary
Active labor market policy (ALMP) has been used at an unprecedently high scale
during the transition process in East Germany in the 1990s. Public sector sponsored
training has been a major part of ALMP with the goal to adjust the skills of the
East German workforce to the needs of a Western market economy. Annual entries
into training programs were around 250 thousand during the years 1993 to 1996. In
comparison to public sector sponsored training in other countries, the East German
experience shows the following five specific aspects. First, participants had fairly
high levels of formal education. Second, access to treatment was easy since targeting
was very low. Third, the market for training provision had to be established and
in the early 1990s case workers had no practical experience on what works. Fourth,
predictions about the catching up process of East Germany and about future labor
market trends proved to be wrong. Fifth, the duration of training programs is fairly
long.
It is often argued, that long–term public sector sponsored training programs show
little or negative short–run employment effects and often it is not possible to assess
whether positive long–run effects exist. For Germany, appropriate data for an eval-
uation of the long–term effects of public sector sponsored training were not available
for a long time. Based on unique administrative data, which have only recently be-
come available, this paper estimates the long–run differential effects on employment
and benefit recipiency of three different types of training programs in East Germany.
Using data on employment, periods of transfer payments, and participation in train-
ing programs, we carefully identify three types of public sector sponsored training
programs for the unemployed. These programs are not associated with a regular
job. The largest program among the three is the Provision of Specific Professional
Skills and Techniques (SPST). SPST programs provide additional skills and specific
professional knowledge in medium–term courses. The two other training programs
are working in a Practice Firm (PF) and Retraining (RT). Typically, RT involves a
two–year program providing complete vocational training in a new occupation and
lasts longer than an SPST program. PF involves training in a work environment
simulating a real job. PF tends to be a slightly shorter treatment than SPST.
We use inflows into unemployment for the years 1993/94 and apply local linear
matching based on the estimated propensity score to estimate the effects of training
programs starting during 1 to 2, 3 to 4, and 5 to 8 quarters of unemployment.
Specifically, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) against
the alternative of nonparticipation in any program. We evaluate medium– and
long–run treatment effects both for employment and benefit recipiency up to 24–30
quarters after the beginning of the treatment depending on the starting date of the
treatment. The analysis is performed separately for males and females.
Our results imply positive medium– and long–run employment effects for the largest
program, Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (SPST), a program
which involves sizeable off–the–job class room training. In contrast, practice firms
show no positive employment effects and this holds also for retraining (the longest
program) in four out of six cases. Furthermore, we do not find any of the three
programs to reduce significantly the benefit recipiency rate in the medium and long
run and in the short run all programs show the lock–in effect with an increase
in the benefit recipiency rate, thus providing evidence for ‘benefit churning’. The
fact that we see increased employment rates and constant benefit recipiency rates
in the long run for SPST means that nonparticipation in the labor market went
down. This suggests that such programs prevent its participants from leaving the
labor force. Overall, the treatment effects are quite similar for females and males.
Our evidence confirms the necessity to analyze long–term effects of sizeable training
programs because all programs show strong negative lock–in effects in the short run.
The positive assessment of SPST compared to practice firms is in contrast to the
conventional wisdom in most of the literature.
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1 Introduction
Active labor market policy (ALMP) has been used at an unprecedently high scale
during the transition process in East Germany in the 1990s. Public sector sponsored
training has been a major part of ALMP with the goal to adjust the skills of the
East German workforce to the needs of a Western market economy. Annual entries
into training programs were around 250 thousand during the years 1993 to 1996
(BA 1993, 1997, 2001). In comparison to public sector sponsored training in other
countries, the East German experience shows the following five specific aspects.
First, participants had fairly high levels of formal education. Second, access to
treatment was easy since targeting was very low. Third, the market for training
provision had to be established and in the early 1990s case workers had no practical
experience on what works. Fourth, predictions about the catching up process of
East Germany and about future labor market trends proved to be wrong. Fifth, the
duration of training programs is fairly long.
During the last decade, there were a lot of pessimistic assessments regarding the use-
fulness of public sector sponsored training programs in raising employment chances
of the unemployed (see the surveys in Fay, 1996; Heckman et al., 1999; Martin
and Grubb, 2001; Kluve and Schmidt, 2002). These studies doubt that large scale
training programs, which are not well targeted, are successful in raising employ-
ment. However, evidence for Eastern European transition economies (other than
East Germany) has often shown positive effects (Kluve et al., 2004; Lubyova and
van Ours, 1999; Puhani, 1999). Recently, OECD (2005) has argued that long-term
labor market programs, such as training, often have little or negative short–run ef-
fects on outcomes, which can be attributed to lock–in effects. However, in some
cases, positive long–term effects exist for long training programs, for which lock–in
effects are worse than for short programs (see also Fay, 1996). Therefore, it is cru-
cial to assess program impacts in a longer term perspective in order to investigate
whether the sizeable lock–in effects in the short run are compensated by positive
long run effects.
For East Germany, appropriate data for a long term evaluation of public sector
sponsored training were not available for a long time and, until recently, the available
evidence has been quite mixed.1 Detailed administrative data have been used in
1See Bergemann et al. (2004), Fitzenberger and Prey (2000), Kraus et al. (1999), or Lechner
(2000) for exemplary studies based on survey data. Speckesser (2004, chapter 1) and Wunsch
(2006, section 6.5) provide comprehensive surveys of this literature, which is not reviewed here for
the sake of brevity, and discuss critically the data used.
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the recent studies of Lechner et al. (2005b) (≡LMW), Fitzenberger and Speckesser
(2007) (≡FS), and Hujer et al. (2006) (≡HTZ), where the first two studies are based
on the same data as this study, while the third uses administrative data since 2000.
HTZ find negative short–run effects which are probably driven by lock–in effects,
while their data do not allow to investigate long–run effects. LMW and FS find
positive medium– and long–run employment effects for some treatments considered
in this paper. LMW evaluate effects of three training programs (long training,
short training, retraining) on employment and benefit recipiency. They find strong
evidence that, on average, the training programs under investigation increase long–
term employment prospects and do not change benefit recipiency. As important
exceptions, long training and retraining show no positive employment effects for
males. FS estimate the employment effects of one major training program (Provision
of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques, SPST) against nonparticipation in
SPST for 36 months after the beginning of the treatment. The analysis is performed
only for the 1993 inflow sample into unemployment. The analysis finds positive
medium–run employment effects, but it does not distinguish between genders.
The vast majority of the existing evaluation studies for East Germany uses a static
evaluation approach, which contrasts receiving treatment during a certain period
of time against the alternative of not receiving treatment during this period of
time (FS and HTZ are recent exceptions). In a dynamic setting, the timing of
events becomes important, see Abbring and van den Berg (2003), Fredriksson and
Johansson (2003, 2004), and Sianesi (2003, 2004). Static treatment evaluations run
the risk of conditioning on future outcomes, leading to possibly biased treatment
effects. This paper follows Sianesi (2003, 2004) and estimates the effects of treatment
starting after some unemployment experience against the alternative of not starting
treatment at this point of time and waiting longer. The actual implementation
of the estimator builds and extends upon FS and Fitzenberger et al. (2006). The
estimated dynamic treatment effects mirror the decision problem of the case worker
and the unemployed who decide recurrently during the unemployment spell, whether
to begin any program now or to postpone participation to the future.
Using a dynamic multiple treatment framework, this study analyzes the effects of
three exclusive training programs (practice firms, SPST, retraining) for inflow sam-
ples into unemployment for the two years 1993/94. We evaluate medium– and
long–run treatment effects both for employment and benefit recipiency up to 24–30
quarters after the beginning of the treatment depending on the starting date of the
treatment. The analysis is performed separately for males and females to reexamine
the evidence in LMW and the two studies differ substantially regarding the exact
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treatment definition, the choice of valid observations, and the econometric methods
used. Our results confirm the positive employment effects for SPST reported in
FS after the initial negative lock–in effect to hold for a much longer time period
and to apply for both males and females. Our study finds no positive employment
effects for practice firms and in four out of six cases for retraining. We do not find
systematic gender differences and, similar to the study Fitzenberger et al. (2006) for
West Germany, our assessment of retraining is considerably worse than of SPST.
Furthermore, we do not find any of the three programs to reduce significantly the
benefit recipiency rate in the medium and long run. In the short run, all programs
show the lock–in effect with an increase in the benefit recipiency rate, thus providing
evidence for ’benefit churning’ as in Kluve et al. (2004).
Our analysis differs considerably from the recent work of LMW, FS, and HTZ. LMW
use a static multiple treatment evaluation approach. They find gender differences
for long training and retraining, which we can not replicate using our dynamic
evaluation approach. We explore potential reasons for the different results. LMW
analyze the effects of treatments starting during the years 93/94 for unemployed
whose unemployment spells start during the years 93/94. We also analyze the
inflows into unemployment for the years 93/94 but we analyze the ATT effects of all
treatments taking place during the first two years of unemployment. We investigate
whether the estimated treatment effects differ for treatments during three different
time windows of elapsed unemployment durations. Furthermore, there are a number
of important differences in the definition of the treatments, the selection of samples,
and the implemented methods. FS use a dynamic treatment evaluation approach for
SPST only. We estimate the effects of three training programs for a much longer time
period after the beginning of the program, and our analysis distinguishes between
genders. In addition to the employment effects, we also analyze the effects on benefit
recipiency. Furthermore, we use a larger inflow sample than FS. In contrast to HTZ,
who estimate a duration model and focus on exits from unemployment, we estimate
medium– and long–run effects on both employment and benefit recipiency, which
we distinguish from lock–in effects. Estimating a duration model, it would be very
difficult to take account of the large number of exits into and out of employment
observed after the first exit from unemployment.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a short de-
scription of the institutional regulation and participation figures for Active Labor
Market Policy. Section 3 focuses on the different options of further training, their
target groups, and course contents. Section 4 describes the methodological approach
to estimate the treatment effects. The empirical results are discussed in section 5.
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Section 6 concludes. The final appendix provides further information on the data
and detailed empirical results. An additional appendix, which is available on our
webpage, includes further details on the data and the empirical results.
2 Basic Regulation and Programs
2.1 Basic Regulation
For the time period considered here, public sector sponsored training in Germany
is regulated by the Labor Promotion Act (Arbeitsfo¨rderungsgesetz, AFG) and is
offered and coordinated by the German Federal Employment Office (formerly Bun-
desanstalt fu¨r Arbeit, BA). We consider the two main training programs: Further
training (Weiterbildung) includes the assessment, maintenance and extension of
skills, including technical development and career advancement. The duration of
the courses depends on individual predispositions and adequate courses provided by
the training suppliers. Retraining (Umschulung) enables vocational re–orientation
if a completed vocational training does not lead to adequate employment. Retrain-
ing is supported for a period up to 2 years and aims at providing a new certified
vocational education degree.
2.2 Evaluated Programs
Further training is a very broad legal category and consists of quite heterogeneous
programs. Hence we utilize a classification developed in FS and evaluate two specific
further training programs: Practice Firms (PF) and provision of specific professional
skills and techniques (SPST).
Practice Firms (PF) are simulated firms in which participants practice everyday
working activities. The areas of practice are whole fields of profession, not specific
professions. Hence, practice firms mainly train general skills while provision of new
professional skills is of less importance. Some of the practice firms are technically
oriented, the practice studios, whereas others are commercially oriented, the practice
enterprises. One of the practice firm’s goals is to evaluate the participant’s aptitude
for a field of profession. The programs usually last for six months and do not provide
official certificates.
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Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (SPST) intends to
improve the starting position for finding a new job by providing additional skills
and specific professional knowledge in medium–term courses. It involves refreshing
specific skills, e.g. computer skills, or training on new operational practices. SPST
mainly consists of classroom training but an acquisition of professional knowledge
through practical work experience may also be provided. After successfully com-
pleting the course, participants usually obtain a certificate indicating the contents
of the course, i.e. the refreshed or newly acquired skills and the amount of theory
and practical work experience. Such a certificate is supposed to serve as an addi-
tional signal to potential employers and to increase the matching probability since
the provision of up to date skills and techniques is considered to be a strong signal
in the search process. The provision of specific professional skills and techniques
aims at sustained reintegration into the labor market by improving skills as well as
providing signals.
Compared to retraining, which is a far more formal and thorough training on a range
of professional skills and which provides a complete vocational training degree, the
role of SPST for a participant’s occupational knowledge is weaker. However, the
amount of occupation specific knowledge imparted in SPST certainly exceeds the
level provided in short–term programs (not evaluated here) that usually aim at
improving job search techniques or general social skills. Thus, SPST ranges in the
middle between very formal (and very expensive) courses and very informal and
short courses (improving general human capital).
Retraining (RT) consists of the provision of a new and comprehensive vocational
training according to the regulation of the German apprenticeship system. It is
targeted to individuals who already completed a first vocational training and face
severe difficulties in finding a new employment within their profession. It might
however also be offered to individuals without a first formal training degree if they
fulfil additional eligibility criteria.
Retraining provides widely accepted formal certificates. It comprises both, theoret-
ical training and practical work experience. The theoretical part of the formation
takes place in the public education system. The practical part is often carried out in
firms that provide work experience in a specific field to the participants, but some-
times also in interplant training establishments. This type of treatment leads to a
certified job qualification in order to improve the job match. Ideally, the training
occupation in retraining corresponds to qualifications which are in high demand in
the labor market.
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2.3 Financial Incentives for Participation
Participants in the training programs considered are granted an income maintenance
(IM, Unterhaltsgeld). To qualify, they must have been employed for at least one year
or they must be entitled to unemployment benefits or subsequent unemployment
assistance.2
Since 1994, IM is equal to the standard unemployment benefits (UB, Arbeitslosen-
geld). It amounts to 67% of previous net earnings for participants with at least
one dependent child and 60% otherwise (note that in 1993 replacement ratios for
IM were higher at 73% and 65%, respectively). In contrast, unemployed, whose
UB expired, can receive the lower, means tested unemployment assistance (UA, Ar-
beitslosenhilfe) which amounts to 57% (with children) and 53% (without children).
This means that for these unemployed IM during the program is higher than UA.
Additionally, participants could defer the transition from UB to the lower UA and,
in some cases, even requalify for the higher UB.
Concluding, there are positive financial incentives for the unemployed to join a
program. In addition, the BA bears all costs directly incurred through participation
in a further training scheme, especially course fees.
3 Data
We use a database which integrates administrative individual data from three dif-
ferent sources (see Bender et al. (2005) for a detailed description). The data contain
spells on
• employment subject to social insurance contributions,
• transfer payments by the BA,
• and participation in training programs.
Further details on the compilation of the data can be found in the additional ap-
pendix.
2For a more detailed description of the institutions, see Bender et al. (2005), Fitzenberger,
Osikominu and Vo¨lter (2006), or Wunsch (2006).
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The basic data source is the IAB Employment Subsample (IAB Bescha¨ftigten-
stichprobe, IABS) for the time period 1975–97, see Bender et al. (2000) and Bender et
al. (2005, chapter 2.1). The IABS is a 1% random sample drawn from employment
register data for all employees subject to social insurance contributions. Therefore,
we restrict the analysis to inflows from employment to unemployment. For this
study, we merge additional information for 1998–2002 to the basic data.
The second important source is the Benefit Payment Register (Leistungsemp-
fa¨ngerdatei, LED) of the Federal Employment Office (BA), see Bender et al. (2005,
chapter 2.2). These data consist of spells on periods of transfer payments granted
by the BA to unemployed and program participants. Besides unemployment ben-
efit or assistance, these data also record very detailed information about income
maintenance payments related to the participation in training programs.
The third data source records training participation (FuU-data). The BA collects
these data for all participants in further training, retraining, and other training
programs for internal monitoring and statistical purposes, see Bender et al. (2005,
chapter 2.3). For every participant the FuU-data contains detailed information
about the program and about the participant.
The FuU–data were merged with the combined IABS–LED data by social insurance
number and additional covariates. Numerous corrections have been implemented in
order to improve the quality of the data, see Bender et al. (2005, chapters 3–4),
FS, and the additional appendix for more information. The IABS provides informa-
tion on personal characteristics and employment histories. The combination of the
transfer payment information and the participation information is used to identify
the likely participation status regarding the different types of training programs.
When an individual is not observed in any of the three spell types (employment,
transfers, training participation), we interpret this as being out of the labor force.
The spell information on the employment state of an individual is first transformed
into monthly dummy variables (based on the dominating state). We construct sep-
arately monthly dummy variables for training status. Then, for our analysis, the
data is aggregated to a quarterly frequency.
Inflow Sample into Unemployment: To analyze the effect of training programs
on employment and benefit recipiency of unemployed individuals, we base our empir-
ical analysis on the sample of inflows into unemployment during the years 1993/94 in
East Germany, omitting Berlin. We consider individuals who experience a transition
from employment to nonemployment and for whom a spell with transfer payments
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from the Federal Employment Office starts during the first 12 months of nonemploy-
ment or for whom the training data indicate program participation before a new job
is found.3 The start of the nonemployment spell is denoted as the beginning of the
unemployment spell. We condition on receipt of unemployment compensation or
program participation to exclude individuals who move out of the labor force.4 This
rule concerns almost exclusively individuals who do not participate in any training
program during their nonemployment spell. A treatment is only considered if the
unemployed does not start employment before the second month of treatment (to
omit training while holding a job). Furthermore, we restrict our samples to the 25
to 55 years old in order to rule out periods of formal education or vocational training
as well as early retirement. For RT, we restrict the sample to the 25 to 50 years old.
We choose the years 1993/94 because data for East Germany start in 1992 and
we want to control for one year of labor market experience before the beginning of
unemployment. Our merged data allow to follow individuals until the end of 2002.
Table 1 gives information about the size of the inflow samples and the incidence of
training.
Participation by Type of Training: We focus on the three types of training
programs PF, SPST, and RT, as described in section 2.2 above. These programs
are trageted to the unemployed and do not involve on–the–job training (training
while working in a regular job). The total inflow sample comprises 6,135 spells for
women and 5,911 spells for men. There are 1,550 training spells for females and 835
for men. Thus, about 25% of the females and 14% of the men participate in one
of the three training programs considered, which reflects the large scale of training
programs during the East German transition process. Among these programs, SPST
represents the largest with 78% and 63% of the training spells, respectively for
females and males. For females 13% and for men 28% of all training spells are RT,
and PF represents the smallest group in both samples. In absolute numbers, there
are 145 (73) PF spells in the female (male) inflow sample, 1,210 (528) SPST spells
and 195 (234) RT spells. Table 2 shows the frequency of training by elapsed duration
of unemployment.
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the elapsed duration of unemployment at
the beginning of treatment. Our discussion focuses on quantiles because averages
may be misleading. The median entrant in PF has been unemployed for 10 months
3This design allows the same individual to be in the sample more than once if it has more than
one transition from employment to unemployment in 1993/94.
4Only 1% of training participants do not receive transfer payments during the first 12 months.
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for females and only for 5 months for males. Late starts (75%–quantile) of PF occur
after 14 months for females and after 11 months for men. SPST is the program
which starts latest with a median of 11 months for females and 7.5 months for men.
RT is the program which starts the earliest for females. The median is 8 months.
The median for males of 6 months is higher than the value for PF. In general, females
start later than men.
Table 4 provides descriptive information on the duration of training spells. The
average durations are quite different between the programs but comparable across
genders. Participation in PF is shortest. On average woman stay 6.5 months in PF
and men 6.1 months. Participation in SPST has an average duration of 9.1 months
for females and 8.8 months for males. Participation in RT lasts almost twice as long
as in SPST with an average of 18.7 months for women and 17.3 months for men.
4 Evaluation Approach
Our goal is to analyze the effect ofK = 3 different training programs on two outcome
variables, namely the individual quarterly employment rate (ER) and the individ-
ual quarterly benefit recipiency rate (BR), both measured as quarterly averages of
monthly dummy variables.5 In a situation where individuals have multiple treat-
ment options, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of one
training program against nonparticipation in any of the three programs. Extend-
ing the static multiple treatment approach to a dynamic setting, we follow Sianesi
(2003, 2004) and apply the standard static treatment approach recursively depend-
ing on the elapsed unemployment duration. This dynamic evaluation approach is
implemented for our problem as in FS and Fitzenberger et al. (2006). The estimated
dynamic ATT parameters mirror the decision problem of the case worker and the un-
employed who decide recurrently during the unemployment spell, whether to begin
any program now or to postpone participation to the future.
Our empirical analysis is based upon the potential–outcome–approach to causal-
ity, see Roy (1951), Rubin (1974), and the survey of Heckman, LaLonde, Smith
(1999). Lechner (2001) and Imbens (2000) extend this framework to allow for mul-
tiple, exclusive treatments. Let the 4 potential outcomes be {Y 0, Y 1, Y 2, Y 3}, where
Y k, k = 1, ..., 3, represents the outcome associated with training program k and Y 0
is the outcome when participating in none of the 3 training programs. For each
5These quarterly rates can take the four values 0, 1/3, 2/3, and 1.
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individual, only one of the K + 1 potential outcomes is observed and the remain-
ing K outcomes are counterfactual. We estimate the average treatment effect on
the treated (ATT) of participating in treatment k = 1, 2, 3 against nonparticipation
k = 0.6
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003, 2004) argue that a static evaluation analysis,
which assigns unemployed individuals to a treatment group and a nontreatment
group based on the treatment information observed in the data, yields biased treat-
ment effects. This is because the definition of the control group conditions on future
outcomes or future treatment. For Sweden, Sianesi (2004) argues that all unem-
ployed individuals are potential future participants in active labor market programs,
a view which is particularly plausible for countries with comprehensive systems of
active labor market policies (like Germany).7 This discussion implies that a purely
static evaluation of the different training programs is not warranted. Following
Sianesi (2003, 2004), we analyze the effects of the first participation in a training
program during the unemployment spell considered conditional on the starting date
of the treatment. We distinguish between treatment starting during quarters 1 to 2
of the unemployment spell (stratum 1), treatment starting during quarters 3 to 4
(stratum 2), and treatment starting during quarters 5 to 8 (stratum 3).
Our estimated ATT parameter has to be interpreted in a dynamic context. We
analyze treatment conditional upon the unemployment spell lasting at least until the
start of the treatment k and this being the first treatment during the unemployment
spell considered. Therefore, the estimated treatment parameter is
θ(k;u, τ) = E(Y k(u, τ)|Tu = k, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0)(1)
−E(Y 0(u, τ)|Tu = k, U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0) ,
where Tu is the treatment variable for treatment starting in quarter u of unem-
ployment and U is the completed duration of the unemployment spell. Y k(u, τ)
and Y 0(u, τ) are the potential treatment outcomes for treatments k and 0, respec-
tively, in periods u + τ , where treatment starts in period u and τ = 0, 1, 2, ...,
counts the quarters since the beginning of treatment. The nontreatment outcome
Y 0(u, τ) refers to the case where the individual does not receive any treatment until
6Using the same approach, a pairwise comparison of the differential effects of the programs
would be feasible, see Lechner (2001) or Fitzenberger et al. (2006). Such a pairwise comparison is
not pursued in this paper for the sake of space.
7In East Germany, active labor market programs were implemented after unification at an
unprecedented scale.
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the end of the stratum considered. Actually, we estimate the treatment parameter
θ(k; τ) =
∑
u guθ(k; u, τ) , which is averaged within a stratum with respect to the
distribution gu of starting dates u.
We evaluate the differential effects of multiple treatments assuming the following
dynamic version of the conditional mean independence assumption (DCIA)8
E(Y 0(u, τ)|U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = 0, Tu = k,X, ben(u))(2)
= E(Y 0(u, τ)|U ≥ u−1, T1 = ... = Tu−1 = Tu = ... = Tu¯ = 0, X, ben(u)) ,
where X are time–invariant (during the unemployment spell) characteristics, ben(u)
is the number of months the unemployed were receiving benefits during the unem-
ployment spell before the start of the treatment u, and u¯ denotes the last quarter of
the stratum considered. We effectively assume that conditional on X, conditional
on being unemployed until period u−1, conditional on having received benefits the
same number of months before u, and conditional on not having received a treatment
before u, individuals treated in u are comparable in their nontreatment outcome to
individuals who do not start any treatment until u¯ (recall from above, that Y 0(u, τ)
involves no treatment until u¯).
Building on Rosenbaum and Rubin’s (1983) result on the balancing property of the
propensity score in the case of a binary treatment, Lechner (2001) shows that the
conditional probability of treatment k, given that the individual receives treatment
k or no treatment 0, P k|k0(X), exhibits an analogous balancing property for the
pairwise estimation of the ATT’s of program k versus no participation 0. This
allows to apply standard binary propensity score matching based on the sample of
individuals participating in either program k or in no program 0 (Lechner, 2001;
Gerfin and Lechner, 2002; Sianesi, 2003). For this subsample, we simply estimate
the probability of treatment k and then apply a bivariate extension of standard
propensity matching techniques. Implicitly, we assume that the actual beginning of
treatment within a stratum is random conditional on X.
To account for the dynamic treatment assignment, we estimate the probability of
treatment k given that unemployment lasts long enough to make an individual ‘eligi-
ble’. For treatment during quarters 1 to 2, we take the total sample of unemployed,
8In addition to DCIA, we also assume that the probability of treatment is less than one con-
ditional on the conditioning variables in equation 2 and that the Stable Unit Treatment Value
assumption holds. These are further assumptions needed to estimate an ATT parameter, see
Heckman, LaLonde, Smith (1999).
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who participate in k or in no program during quarters 1 to 2 (stratum 1), and
estimate a Probit model for participation in k. This group includes those unem-
ployed who either never participate in any program or who start some treatment
after quarter 2. For treatment during strata 2 and 3, the basic sample consists of
those unemployed who are still unemployed at the beginning of the stratum.
We implement a stratified local linear matching approach by imposing that the
matching partners for an individual receiving treatment k are still unemployed in
the quarter (of elapsed unemployment duration) before treatment k starts and have
received benefits the same number of months until the quarter before treatment
starts. The expected counterfactual employment outcome for nonparticipation is
obtained by means of a local linear regression on the propensity score and the start-
ing month of the unemployment spell to match on calender time. We use a bivariate
crossvalidation procedure to obtain the bandwidths in both dimensions (propensity
score and beginning of unemployment spell). An estimate for the variance of the esti-
mated treatment effects is obtained through bootstrapping based on 200 resamples.9
This way, we take account of the sampling variability in the estimated propensity
score.
As a balancing test, we use the regression test suggested in Smith and Todd (2005) to
investigate whether the time–invariant (during the unemployment spell) covariates
are balanced sufficiently by matching on the estimated propensity score P k|k0(X)
using a flexible polynomial approximation. Furthermore, we investigate whether
treated and matched nontreated individuals differ significantly in their outcomes
before the beginning of treatment, in addition to those already used as arguments of
the propensity score. We estimate these differences in the same way as the treatment
effects after the beginning of the program. By construction, treated individuals
and their matched counterparts exhibit the same unemployment duration until the
beginning of treatment.
9Abadie and Imbens (2006) show that the bootstrap fails for nearest neighbor matching because
of a lack of smoothness resulting in local convergence not being uniform (see also Heckman et al.,
1998, p. 276). In contrast, local linear matching with appropriate trimming to guarantee com-
mon support and under a weak convergence condition for the bandwidth parameters, is shown by
Heckman et al. (1998, p. 278) to exhibit sufficiently smooth convergence for standard asymptotic
distribution theory to hold. In particular, the estimated ATT parameter has a standard asymp-
totically linear representation and it is asymptotically normally distributed with
√
N convergence
rate. Although we are not aware of a formal proof, the bootstrap is therefore likely to be valid
for local linear matching. Horowitz (2001, section 2) discusses the consistency of the bootstrap
for
√
N asymptotically normal estimators with an asymptotically linear representation. Although
local linear matching involves an intermediate nonparametric estimation step, a similar result is
likely to hold.
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Finally, we need to discuss why we think that the DCIA (2) is plausible for our
application. As Sianesi (2004), we argue that the participation probability depends
upon the variables determining re-employment prospects once unemployment be-
gan. Consequently, all individuals are considered who have left employment in
the same two years (matching controls for beginning of unemployment) and who
have experienced the same unemployment duration and the same number of months
receiving benefits before program participation. Furthermore, observable individ-
ual characteristics and information from the previous employment spell have been
included in the propensity score estimation. E.g., we consider skill information,
regional information, occupational status, and industry which should be crucial for
re-employment chances. Unfortunately, our data lack subjective assessments of la-
bor market chances of the unemployed (e.g. by case workers). We argue that these
are proxied sufficiently by the observed covariates in so far as they affect selection
into the program. This is particularly plausible, since participation occurred at a
large scale, assignment was not very targeted, and case workers lacked practical
experience on ’what works’ in a quickly changing economic environment. Support-
ing our point of view, Schneider et al. (2006) argue that until 2002 assignment to
training was strongly driven by the supply of available courses.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Estimation of Propensity Scores
Our empirical analysis is performed separately for females and males. To estimate
the propensity scores, we run Probit regressions for each of the three programs for
taking part in this program versus not taking part in any program (“waiting”) for
training starting during the three time intervals for elapsed unemployment duration,
i.e. 1–2 quarters (stratum 1), 3–4 quarters (stratum 2), and 5–8 quarters (stratum 3).
The additional appendix reports our preferred specifications, which are obtained af-
ter extensive specification search, summary statistics of the covariates used, detailed
results of the balancing tests, and figures on common support.
The covariates considered are all defined for the beginning of unemployment and are
thus time–invariant for an individual during the unemployment spell. Personal char-
acteristics considered are age, marital status and formal education (with/without
vocational training degree, tertiary education degree). In addition, we use informa-
tion about the last employer, namely industrial sector and firm size, and a number
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of characteristics of the previous job such as employment status and information
on earnings in the previous job. Regarding the employment and program participa-
tion history, we consider the employment history and participation in any ALMP
program in the year before the beginning of unemployment. Differences in regional
labor market conditions as well as supply of programs are the reason to include
regional variables in the specification. We use the federal state and the population
density at the district level. Finally, we also use the calendar month of the beginning
of the unemployment period.
Our specification search starts by using as many as possible of the covariates men-
tioned above without interactions. The specification search is mainly led by the
following two criteria: (i) single and joint significance, and (ii) balance of the co-
variates according to the regression based balancing test in Smith and Todd (2005).
In general, insignificant covariates are dropped. We also test for the significance of
interaction effects, in particular interactions with age. In order to achieve balance
of covariates, we test different functional forms and interaction effects. In a few
cases, we keep insignificant covariates or interactions, when they help to achieve
balance. As we find the balancing test to be somewhat sensitive to small cell sizes
we occasionally aggregate small groups that have similar coefficients.
The results for the Probit estimates show that the final specifications vary consid-
erably between men and women and the three time intervals for a given program.
Age effects are significant in most cases. In particular, participants in retraining are
younger than individuals in other groups.
Our chosen specifications for the propensity score pass the regression based balancing
test (no rejection) of Smith and Todd (2005) for a sufficiently large number of
covariates. We graphically examine the common support requirement for estimating
the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). Overall, we are satisfied with
the overlap of support in all cases and proceed without restricting the samples.10
5.2 Estimated Treatment Effects
We estimate the effects of the three types of training programs PF, SPST, and RT,
separately for males and females. The two outcome variables considered are the
individual quarterly employment rate (ER) and benefit recipiency rate (BR: UB, UA,
10In four cases (out of 16) we have to drop one and in one case two treated individuals from the
treatment effect estimations due to numerical problems.
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or IM; see section 2.3). We match participants in treatment k and nonparticipants in
any treatment, who are still unemployed in the quarter before treatment starts and
have received benefits the same number of months until the quarter before treatment
starts, by their similarity in the estimated propensity scores and the starting month
of the unemployment spell. The ATT is then estimated separately for quarters τ
since the beginning of program k for stratum 1, 2, and 3.
Figures 1–6 display the estimated treatment effects θˆ(k; τ) on the horizontal axis
against quarter τ ≥ 0 since the beginning of treatment or quarter τ < 0 before the
beginning of treatment. The time axis is divided into three parts by two vertical
lines, which denote the last quarter before the unemployment spell starts and the
treatment start τ = 0, respectively. The left part shows the four quarters before
unemployment starts, the middle part the gap between the beginning of the unem-
ployment spell and the beginning of treatment and the right part the time since
treatment start. Each figure contains a panel of three times four graphs (except PF
for males, with only stratum 1 in figure 2), where each row represents represents
one stratum of elapsed duration of unemployment. The first and third column show
the evolution of average outcomes for treated individuals (solid line) and their esti-
mated nontreatment counterfactual (dashed line). The differences of these lines are
displayed in the second and fourth column (solid line), respectively, as the estimated
treatment effects together with pointwise 95%–confidence bands (dashed lines). To
summarize the graphical evidence in a systematic way, tables 6 and 7 provide cumu-
lated treatment effects (
∑L−1
τ=0 θˆ(k; τ)) over the first L = 8, 16, and 24 quarters since
beginning of treatment and average treatment effects during quarter 4 to 23 and 8
to 23 [1/(24− l)∑23τ=l θˆ(k; τ) for l = 4, 8]. These aggregated effects are calculated as
sums or averages of the effects depicted graphically.
The treatment PF (figures 1–2) basically shows statistically significant negative
lock–in effects on ER during the first six quarters (the solid line in the first columns
lies below the dashed line)11 and no significant positive ER effects afterwards. The
BR effects are almost symmetric, with positive BR effects during the lock–in period
and mostly no significant BR effects afterwards, except for stratum 3 for women
where the BR effect seems to be quite volatile and often significantly positive in the
medium– and long–run. The results are quite similar in stratum 1 for both genders.
The graphical evidence is confirmed in tables 6 and 7. We restrict our discussion of
the aggregated effects to the cumulated effects over 24 quarters and to the average
effects during quarter 8 to 23. None of the aggregated ER effects is significant. For
11We discuss lock–in effects for the time it takes for the treated individuals to catch up with the
nontreated individuals.
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BR, we find no significant aggregated effects on women for stratum 1 and 2. For Men
in stratum 1 the cumulated effect on BR is significantly positive, but the average
effect is insignificant. For stratum 3, we find both effects to be significantly positive.
Thus, the treatment PF shows no positive employment effects, but it increases the
benefit recipiency rate for women starting treatment later in their unemployment
spell.
The evidence for SPST in figures 3–4 is much more positive and confirms the results
in FS. After strong negative lock–in effects during a period of almost two years,
we find positive and mostly significant medium– and long–run employment effects
of around 10 percentage points (pp), which typically persist until the end of the
observation period. The effects on BR are similar to PF, i.e. treatment increases BR
in the short run, and the medium– and long–run effects are not significantly different
from zero. The cumulated ER increases lie between 0 and 1.5 quarters. They are
significant for stratum 1 and insignificant for the later strata. The average ER effects
are highly significant and amount to about 10 pp in all cases. All cumulated BR
effects are positive and significantly so for strata 2 and 3. The average BR effects
are never significant. The effects for both genders are very similar.
For RT, the evidence in figures 5–6 is more mixed. As to be expected, we find the
longest (typically lasting 10 quarters) and deepest lock–in effects for this treatment,
with stratum 1 for men showing the strongest decline. The medium– and long–
run ER effects are only significantly positive for males in stratum 1 and females in
stratum 3. For women in stratum 1 the effects are sometimes significantly positive.
The three other cases basically show insignificant ER effects in the medium– and
long–run, although they are positive in most periods. Again, we find positive BR ef-
fects during the lock–in period and typically insignificant BR effects in the medium–
and long–run for strata 2 and 3. For stratum 1 we see a medium– and long–run
reduction, but which is only sometimes significant. Almost all of the cumulated ER
effects are insignificantly negative, stratum 2 for men shows a significantly nega-
tive effect and stratum 3 for women an insignificantly positive one. Confirming the
graphical evidence, the average ER effects are significant only for males in stratum 1
(around 12 pp) and females in stratum 3 (around 16 pp). All cumulated BR effects
are significantly positive. The average BR effects are only significant for males in
stratum 2 and 3.
No case in 1–6 shows significant differences in outcomes before the beginning of
the unemployment spell. Since we include the employment history in the propen-
sity score estimation, this is not a pre-program test of the CIA. But the results
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show that our matching approach balances well the employment history of treated
and nontreated individuals. Note furthermore that lock–effects last fairly long in
comparison to results for West Germany, see Lechner et al. (2005a), LMW, FS, and
Fitzenberger et al. (2006). A likely reason is that search frictions in the labor market
are higher in East Germany compared to West Germany.
Overall, our results do not confirm the gender differences in the treatment effects as
found in LMW. Neither for SPST, which comprises most of the long training as in
LMW, and nor for RT, we find that employment effects are higher for females com-
pared to males and that males show zero or negative long–run effects.12 To explore
reasons for the differences in results, we first would like to reexamine the evidence on
gender differences in the content of training as reported in LMW, which the authors
identify as a potential reason for the gender differences in the treatment effects.
Programs are characterized by the target profession of training. This information is
contained in table 5 stratified by gender, program, and stratum. Large differences
show up between genders as also documented in LMW. PF for women mainly train
in office professions (38%–48%) and in broader programs (20–27%), which can not
be related to a specific profession. For female participants in SPST these fields are
also the most important with 20–30% for office professions and 13–31% for broader
programs. RT for women train mainly in service professions (17–28%), office profes-
sions (12–25%) and health professions (10–22%). For males, the programs PF and
RT are dominated by target professions in construction, which have a share of at
least 40%, and even 56% for men in RT in stratum 3. Metal professions are second
most important for PF and RT in stratum 1 and 2 with about 25%. RT in stratum
3 trains only 12% in metal professions. SPST for men is concentrated in service
professions (13–22%) and technical professions (13–19 %) for all strata. In strata
1 and 2 metal professions are most important with 27 and 23% and construction
is also important with 13 and 17%. In the third stratum broad programs are most
important with 32%. Thus, our data show similar gender differences in the content
of training as reported by LMW.
Now, we explore further possible explanations of the differences in the estimated
treatment effects for RT. We focus on RT because SPST differs from long training
as defined in LMW and target professions in construction have a fairly small share in
SPST. First, the differences to LMW are not due to the fact that LMW use a static
12As one exception, we find positive effects of RT for females and not for males in stratum
3. However, the number of treated males in stratum 3 is very small and the results in LMW
correspond mainly to stratum 1 and 2 because the construction of the treatment sample in LMW
oversamples early treatments, see discussion below.
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evaluation approach, while we estimate the effects of treatment versus waiting. To
investigate this, we reestimate the treatment effects in stratum 1 excluding the future
participants in any training program from the control group (around 10% of the male
and around 20% of the female controls are excluded, see additional appendix). The
results for males basically do not change while the estimated treatment effects for
females are reduced to some extent (these results are available upon request). Thus,
the difference in evaluation approach should work in the opposite direction and can
not explain the differences in the results. Second, since LMW suggest that males do
not show positive long–run employment effects from RT because of the large share
of target professions in construction, we estimate the treatment effects of RT for
males separately with target profession in construction and in nonconstruction. We
exclude the cases where the target profession is missing. The results (see additional
appendix for details) clearly show that the employment effects for target profession
construction are by no means smaller than for target profession nonconstruction.
In fact, the point estimates for stratum 1 and 2 even suggest that in most cases
the medium– and long–run employment effects are higher for target professions in
construction (these differences are, however, not significant). Third, the differences
in the sample construction (see table in additional appendix for a juxtaposition)
between our paper and LMW show that LMW oversample early treatments. This
should work in the opposite direction of the differences in the results, because in
stratum 1 men but not women show positive employment effects for RT (see footnote
12). There are a number of further differences in the construction of the sample
which, however, seem unlikely to explain the differences in results.
Concluding, we can not replicate the gender differences in results reported in LMW
and we can not confirm differences in treatment effects by target profession as sug-
gested by LMW. We have explored possible reasons to rationalize these differences
but, unfortunately, the reason for these differences in results remains an open ques-
tion.
6 Conclusions
Using a dynamic multiple treatment framework, this study analyzes the effects of
three exclusive training programs for inflows into unemployment for the two years
1993/94. We evaluate medium– and long–run treatment effects both for employment
and benefit recipiency up to 24–30 quarters after the beginning of the treatment de-
pending on the starting date of the treatment and we distinguish by gender. Our
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results imply positive medium– and long–run employment effects for the largest pro-
gram, Provision of Specific Professional Skills and Techniques (SPST), a program
which involves sizeable off–the–job class room training. In contrast, practice firms
show no positive employment effects and this holds also for retraining (the longest
program) in four out of six cases. Furthermore, we do not find any of the three
programs to reduce significantly the benefit recipiency rate in the medium and long
run, in the short run all programs show the lock–in effect with an increase in the
benefit recipiency rate, thus providing evidence for ’benefit churning’ as in Kluve et
al. (2004). The fact that we see increased ER and constant BR in the long run for
SPST means that nonparticipation in the labor market went down. This suggests
that such programs prevent its participants from leaving the labor force. Overall,
the treatment effects are quite similar for females and males, thus, we can not con-
firm the gender differences found in Lechner et al. (2005b). Our evidence confirms
the necessity to analyze long–term effects of sizeable training programs because all
programs show strong negative lock–in effects in the short run. The positive assess-
ment of SPST compared to practice firms is in contrast to the conventional wisdom
in most of the literature. As a final caveat, an overall assessment of the microeco-
nomic effects is not possible since various necessary information for a comprehensive
cost–benefit–analysis are lacking in our data set.
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Appendix
Descriptive Statistics and Description of Data
Table 1: Participation in First Training Program for the Inflow Samples into Un-
employment
Training Program Frequency Percent of Percent among
inflow sample treated
Women
Practice Firm 145 2.4 9.4
SPST 1,210 19.7 78.1
Retraining 195 3.2 12.6
No training program above 4,585 74.7 –
Total inflow sample 6,135 100 100
Men
Practice Firm 73 1.2 8.7
SPST 528 8.9 63.2
Retraining 234 4.0 28.0
No training program above 5,076 85.9 –
Total inflow sample 5,911 100 100
Remark: Programs that start before a new job is found are considered. We exclude training
programs which start together with a job (like integration subsidies) or which involve a very
small number of participants since they are not targeted on inflows into unemployment (as
career advancement and German language courses).
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Table 2: Number of Training Spells and Length of Unemployment before Program
Start
Women Men
Practice Firm
1–2 quarters 37 40
3–4 quarters 51 15
5–8 quarters 48 14
>8 quarters 9 4
Total 145 73
SPST
1–2 quarters 254 200
3–4 quarters 374 141
5–8 quarters 435 144
>8 quarters 147 43
Total 1,210 528
Retraining
1–2 quarters 61 (61) 113 (107)
3–4 quarters 76 (75) 82 (79)
5–8 quarters 53 (53) 35 (33)
>8 quarters 5 (5) 4 (4)
Total 195 (194) 234 (223)
Remark: The time intervals indicate the quarter of program start relative to the beginning
of the unemployment spell. The numbers in parenthesis for RT are participants who are less
than 51 years old when entering unemployment.
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Table 3: Elapsed Duration of Unemployment in Months at Beginning of Training
Spell
Women Men
Practice Firm
Average 10.9 8.1
25%–Quantile 5 2
Median 10 5
75%–Quantile 14 11
SPST
Average 12.8 10.4
25%–Quantile 6 4
Median 11 7.5
75%–Quantile 18 15
Retraining
Average 8.9 6.8
25%–Quantile 4 3
Median 8 6
75%–Quantile 12 10
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Table 4: Realized Duration of Training Spells in months
Women Men
Practice Firm
Average 6.5 6.1
25%–Quantile 6 4
Median 6 6
75%–Quantile 7 8
SPST
Average 9.1 8.8
25%–Quantile 6 4
Median 10 9
75%–Quantile 12 12
Retraining
Average 18.7 17.3
25%–Quantile 15 12
Median 21 21
75%–Quantile 22 22
Remark: The duration of the training spell is defined as the number of months of continuous
training. No interruptions are allowed. If in any month we do not identify the program we
assume the program has ended the month before.
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Table 5: Program fields of (target) profession
Program field (see below)
Stratum 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 missing
Women
PF 1 14 5 5 3 0 0 8 0 38 0 0 27 0
PF 2 6 4 6 2 4 2 4 4 43 0 6 20 0
PF 3 4 2 2 2 2 6 4 0 48 0 8 21 0
SPST 1 5 0 4 0 3 9 1 18 30 6 11 13 26
SPST 2 4 2 5 0 4 11 2 10 20 8 14 20 30
SPST 3 3 2 2 1 2 11 0 7 21 6 13 31 31
RT 1 6 0 4 2 0 10 2 8 12 20 28 8 18
RT 2 9 1 4 6 4 1 0 1 16 22 27 6 12
RT 3 12 2 4 8 4 8 0 0 25 10 17 8 9
Men
PF 1 2 25 0 42 2 0 0 2 2 0 5 18 0
SPST 1 3 27 1 13 13 3 8 4 1 0 22 5 29
SPST 2 2 23 1 17 19 4 5 6 1 2 13 5 34
SPST 3 2 10 1 7 15 0 7 4 1 0 21 32 43
RT 1 3 27 0 43 2 1 7 0 0 2 12 3 17
RT 2 1 26 1 40 6 4 7 0 1 6 6 1 12
RT 3 0 12 0 56 3 0 3 0 6 3 15 3 3
Total 4 9 3 10 5 6 3 6 16 5 14 17 25
Remark: The table shows the distribution of the fields of profession for the programs by
stratum and gender in percent of the nonmissing information. The fields are the following:
1 agriculture, basic materials, leather, textiles 2 metal 3 food 4 construction 5 technical 6
retail sales 7 transport 8 accounting 9 office 10 health 11 services 12 broader program. The
last column gives the share of missing information.
Estimated Effects of Further Training Measures
Figures 1–6 display the estimated treatment effects θˆ(k; τ) on the horizontal axis
against quarter τ ≥ 0 since the beginning of treatment or quarter τ < 0 before the
beginning of treatment. The time axis is divided into three parts by two vertical
lines, which denote the last quarter before the unemployment spell starts and the
treatment start τ = 0, respectively. The left part shows the four quarters before
unemployment starts, the middle part the gap between the beginning of the unem-
ployment spell and the beginning of treatment and the right part the time since
treatment start.
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Additional Appendix to “Long–Run Effects of
Training Programs for the Unemployed in East
Germany”
A Estimation Results for the Propensity Score
A.1 Sample Sizes
A.1.1 Sample Sizes by Stratum
Women
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Waiting 5783 (4652) 3855 (2996) 2294 (1671)
PF 37 51 48
SPST 254 374 435
RT 61 (61) 76 (75) 53 (53)
Men
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Waiting 5558 (4444) 2705 (2046) 1381 (997)
PF 40 15 14
SPST 200 141 144
RT 113 (107) 82 (79) 35 (33)
Remark: Numbers in Parentheses exclude the 51–55 year old. We use this further restricted
sample to evaluate RT. We do not evaluate PF for males in stratum 2 and 3 due to the
small sample size.
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A.1.2 Sample Sizes by Quarter
Quarter of Inflows Outflows controls share trt alternative alt share
unempl. Job PF SPST RT later controls trt later
Women
1 6135 621 12 119 33 5783 0.207 5971 0.232
2 5350 806 25 135 28 5162 0.232 5162 0.232
3 4356 582 28 206 42 3855 0.181 4080 0.226
4 3498 443 23 168 34 3273 0.213 3273 0.213
5 2830 408 21 157 31 2294 0.070 2621 0.186
6 2213 241 10 115 11 1886 0.085 2077 0.169
7 1836 155 10 99 7 1645 0.098 1720 0.137
8 1565 127 7 64 4 1490 0.108 1490 0.108
9+ 1363 1202 9 147 5 mean mean
0.175 0.206
Men
1 5911 1315 20 80 57 5558 0.087 5754 0.118
2 4439 1300 20 120 56 4243 0.114 4243 0.114
3 2943 729 10 84 52 2705 0.090 2797 0.120
4 2068 402 5 57 30 1976 0.123 1976 0.123
5 1574 272 4 52 23 1381 0.037 1495 0.110
6 1223 176 2 34 6 1109 0.046 1181 0.104
7 1005 102 3 29 3 933 0.055 970 0.091
8 868 68 5 29 3 831 0.061 831 0.061
9+ 763 712 4 43 4 mean mean
0.088 0.113
Remark: The table shows quarter by quarter of elapsed unemployment duration the number
of those who are still unemployed at the beginning of the quarter (inflows) and the number
of those who during the quarter start a job (job) or a treatment (PF, SPST, RT). Controls
are all those who are still unemployed at the beginning of the quarter but do not start a
treatment during the stratum. The share of the controls who start a treatment during a
later stratum is also given. An alternative definition of control persons (not pursued in the
paper) would take as controls all those, who are still unemployed at the beginning of the
quarter but do not start a treatment during the quarter. This would lead to a slightly higher
share of controls who receive treatment later. The means are weighted means. The table
considers the sample age 25–55 at the beginning of unemployment. The restricted version
age 25–50 for RT is available upon request from the authors. The number for outflows in
jobs in quarter 9+ include those, who never again start a job.
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A.2 Variable Definitions
Table 8: Variable Definitions
Label Definition
Personal Attributes
aXXYY Age at start of unemployment ≥XX and ≤ YY
age Age at start of unemployment
married Married
qual l No vocational training degree or education information miss-
ing
qual m Vocational training degree
qual h University/College degree
Last Employment
BER1 Apprentice
BER2 Blue Collar Worker
BER3 White Collar Worker
BER4 Worker at home with low hours or BER missing
BER5 Part–time working
pearn Daily earnings ≥ 15 Euro per day in 1995 Euro
earnlow Daily earnings < 15 Euro per day in 1995 Euro
earncens Earnings censored at social security taxation threshold
earn Daily earnings
logearn log(earn) if pearn=1 and earncens=0, otherwise zero
Last Employer
industry1 Agriculture
industry2 Basic materials
industry3 Metal, vehicles, electronics
industry4 Light industry
industry5 Construction
industry6 Production oriented services, trade, banking
industry7 Consumer oriented services, organization and social services
frmsize1 Firm Size (employment) missing or ≤ 10
frmsize2 Firm Size (employment) > 10 and ≤ 200
frmsize3 Firm Size (employment) > 200 and ≤ 500
<continued on next page>
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Table 8: Variable Definitions <continued>
Label Definition
frmsize4 Firm Size (employment) > 500
Employment and Program History
preexM Employed M (M=6, 12) month before unemployment starts
preex12cum Number of months employed in the last 12 months before
unemployment starts, standardized
pretx1 Participation in any ALMP program reported in our data in
the year before unemployment starts
Regional Information
state1 Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
state2 Brandenburg
state3 Sachsen-Anhalt
state4 Sachsen
state5 Thu¨ringen
popdens population density (standardized)
Calendar Time of Entry into Unemployment
uentry First unemployment month (months counted from January
1993
Interaction of Variables / Functional Form
sq squared
interaction
All variables are defined at the time of entry into unemployment
and constant during the unemployment spell.
A.3 Summary Statistics
The following six tables document the mean values of the variables in the three
strata for women and men. The means are shown for the dynamic control group
and the participants in PF, SPST and RT, respectively. Since we restrict the age for
the evaluation of RT to lie between 25 and 50, we show the means for the dynamic
control group also for this more restricted group and for RT only for this age group.
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Table 9: Women Stratum 1
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 40.088 36.886 40.757 39.819 33.689
married .59 .576 .514 .61 .738
qual l .108 .098 .081 .039 .066
qual m .843 .851 .892 .89 .869
qual h .049 .05 .027 .071 .066
BER1 .003 .004 0 0 0
BER2 .428 .425 .432 .252 .443
BER3 .391 .399 .405 .535 .393
BER4 .002 .002 0 0 0
BER5 .176 .171 .162 .213 .164
pearn .966 .967 .973 .996 1
earncens .004 .004 0 .004 0
logearn 3.447 3.445 3.521 3.647 3.657
industry1 .066 .064 .027 .047 .016
industry2 .047 .044 .027 .043 .115
industry3 .064 .064 .189 .075 .066
industry4 .074 .072 .081 .071 .033
industry5 .036 .038 .081 .035 .049
industry6 .264 .269 .162 .303 .18
industry7 .45 .45 .432 .425 .541
frmsize1 .229 .235 .081 .193 .18
frmsize2 .447 .447 .676 .433 .344
frmsize3 .152 .148 .189 .177 .213
frmsize4 .173 .169 .054 .197 .262
preex6 .842 .835 .784 .846 .934
preex12 .764 .747 .757 .827 .836
preex12cum 10.153 10.052 9.811 10.354 11.033
pretx1 .077 .083 .054 .031 .066
state1 .139 .144 .081 .154 .131
state2 .167 .169 0 .118 .246
state3 .209 .207 .162 .205 .115
state4 .304 .299 .216 .362 .377
Continued on next page...
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... table 9 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
state5 .18 .179 .541 .161 .131
popdens 468.023 463.781 422.692 544.084 379.189
uentry 10.721 10.847 8.892 13 10.033
N 5783 4652 37 254 61
Table 10: Women Stratum 2
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 40.777 37.183 41.176 38.623 33.12
married .587 .568 .667 .61 .627
qual l .133 .122 .039 .078 .08
qual m .828 .838 .863 .834 .893
qual h .039 .04 .098 .088 .027
BER1 .003 .003 0 .005 0
BER2 .432 .433 .353 .294 .427
BER3 .373 .378 .49 .559 .413
BER4 .002 .002 0 0 0
BER5 .191 .185 .157 .142 .16
pearn .963 .963 1 .979 1
earncens .003 .003 .02 .003 .013
logearn 3.427 3.419 3.562 3.593 3.609
industry1 .058 .058 0 .037 .053
industry2 .051 .048 .078 .029 .053
industry3 .061 .058 .098 .091 .08
industry4 .073 .073 .02 .056 .027
industry5 .038 .041 0 .027 .027
industry6 .261 .263 .294 .342 .32
industry7 .457 .459 .51 .417 .44
frmsize1 .222 .228 .176 .203 .173
frmsize2 .439 .439 .353 .428 .44
frmsize3 .156 .154 .235 .144 .16
Continued on next page...
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... table 10 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
frmsize4 .182 .179 .235 .225 .227
preex6 .859 .85 .922 .832 .92
preex12 .793 .77 .784 .786 .867
preex12cum 10.374 10.242 10.843 10.257 11.027
pretx1 .072 .079 .059 .053 .08
state1 .135 .138 .157 .139 .227
state2 .172 .174 .02 .155 .147
state3 .216 .215 .333 .233 .147
state4 .292 .288 .275 .329 .36
state5 .185 .186 .216 .144 .12
popdens 466.479 461.806 520.108 561.464 392.724
uentry 10.321 10.433 8.157 13.024 11.733
N 3855 2996 51 374 75
Table 11: Women Stratum 3
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 41.668 37.309 43.604 40.609 33.453
married .589 .57 .542 .591 .547
qual l .159 .147 .083 .099 .075
qual m .805 .814 .896 .857 .906
qual h .036 .038 .021 .044 .019
BER1 .003 .003 .021 0 0
BER2 .449 .454 .292 .368 .528
BER3 .341 .342 .583 .446 .434
BER4 .001 .002 0 .002 0
BER5 .206 .199 .104 .184 .038
pearn .959 .959 .938 .982 1
earncens .004 .003 0 .002 0
logearn 3.395 3.388 3.452 3.562 3.674
industry1 .06 .06 .042 .048 .038
Continued on next page...
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... table 11 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
industry2 .051 .046 .125 .064 .075
industry3 .063 .059 .104 .057 .094
industry4 .075 .073 .042 .094 .075
industry5 .041 .045 0 .037 .038
industry6 .246 .247 .313 .308 .189
industry7 .464 .47 .375 .391 .491
frmsize1 .221 .23 .188 .152 .075
frmsize2 .436 .437 .438 .453 .396
frmsize3 .158 .151 .063 .182 .17
frmsize4 .185 .181 .313 .214 .358
preex6 .866 .855 .917 .906 .887
preex12 .804 .774 .813 .853 .849
preex12cum 10.448 10.284 10.979 10.906 10.755
pretx1 .06 .068 .083 .078 .057
state1 .121 .121 .229 .103 .189
state2 .167 .168 .021 .2 .094
state3 .228 .228 .229 .172 .208
state4 .289 .284 .333 .368 .226
state5 .195 .199 .188 .156 .283
popdens 453.54 451.059 642.06 559.151 534.315
uentry 10.242 10.373 9.458 9.874 6.755
N 2294 1671 48 435 53
Table 12: Men Stratum 1
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 40.124 36.84 36.975 40.035 33.449
married .466 .435 .475 .56 .421
qual l .094 .089 .125 .06 .075
qual m .842 .851 .825 .75 .897
qual h .063 .059 .05 .19 .028
Continued on next page...
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... table 12 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
BER1 .001 .002 .025 0 0
BER2 .794 .804 .85 .6 .86
BER3 .167 .161 .075 .34 .112
BER4 0 0 0 .005 0
BER5 .037 .033 .05 .055 .028
pearn .991 .991 1 .995 .991
earncens .015 .014 0 .03 0
logearn 3.647 3.649 3.72 3.711 3.727
industry1 .079 .074 .05 .05 .084
industry2 .072 .075 .075 .115 .103
industry3 .116 .113 .1 .165 .196
industry4 .056 .056 .05 .05 .065
industry5 .207 .227 .175 .115 .121
industry6 .221 .234 .15 .29 .262
industry7 .248 .222 .4 .215 .168
frmsize1 .255 .27 .175 .19 .131
frmsize2 .501 .503 .425 .49 .533
frmsize3 .12 .109 .1 .115 .121
frmsize4 .124 .118 .3 .205 .215
preex6 .845 .835 .875 .845 .869
preex12 .776 .761 .75 .87 .776
preex12cum 10.223 10.097 10.175 10.56 10.533
pretx1 .064 .069 .025 .03 .075
state1 .14 .141 .2 .2 .168
state2 .147 .152 .05 .13 .14
state3 .209 .213 .4 .165 .243
state4 .323 .319 .15 .35 .346
state5 .18 .175 .2 .155 .103
popdens 460.115 463.21 340.144 604.944 499.402
uentry 10.6 10.657 9.425 12.01 10.533
N 5558 4444 40 200 107
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Table 13: Men Stratum 2
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 41.316 37.473 38.933 40.099 34.443
married .44 .396 .333 .44 .405
qual l .12 .118 .133 .078 .114
qual m .805 .812 .867 .801 .797
qual h .075 .07 0 .121 .089
BER1 .002 .002 0 0 0
BER2 .761 .771 1 .645 .823
BER3 .197 .19 0 .319 .165
BER4 0 0 0 0 0
BER5 .04 .037 0 .035 .013
pearn .988 .988 1 .993 1
earncens .019 .016 0 .021 .013
logearn 3.61 3.615 3.67 3.666 3.715
industry1 .06 .053 .2 .035 .051
industry2 .078 .081 0 .057 .089
industry3 .115 .107 .067 .128 .165
industry4 .053 .055 .133 .043 .076
industry5 .174 .195 .133 .149 .139
industry6 .23 .242 .133 .312 .241
industry7 .29 .266 .333 .277 .241
frmsize1 .229 .247 .133 .199 .19
frmsize2 .487 .489 .6 .447 .57
frmsize3 .131 .118 .2 .163 .139
frmsize4 .153 .146 .067 .191 .101
preex6 .839 .82 .867 .844 .886
preex12 .783 .761 .733 .787 .861
preex12cum 10.216 10.005 10.067 10.277 10.772
pretx1 .062 .07 .067 .043 .038
state1 .134 .135 .333 .113 .19
state2 .152 .157 0 .106 .114
state3 .232 .236 .333 .284 .177
state4 .308 .304 .133 .355 .304
Continued on next page...
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... table 13 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
state5 .174 .167 .2 .142 .215
popdens 487.763 491.47 361.654 646.669 410.726
uentry 10.461 10.605 13.267 13.376 9.405
N 2705 2046 15 141 79
Table 14: Men Stratum 3
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
age 42.142 37.872 41.929 42.201 34.364
married .433 .391 .5 .41 .333
qual l .125 .123 .071 .153 .242
qual m .791 .794 .929 .674 .727
qual h .084 .082 0 .174 .03
BER1 .001 .002 0 .007 0
BER2 .736 .741 .714 .611 .788
BER3 .218 .217 .286 .333 .182
BER4 0 0 0 0 0
BER5 .045 .04 0 .049 .03
pearn .986 .987 1 .986 .97
earncens .025 .022 0 .056 0
logearn 3.572 3.579 3.651 3.503 3.669
industry1 .056 .045 .071 .021 .03
industry2 .078 .077 .071 .069 .091
industry3 .122 .113 .143 .125 .091
industry4 .053 .06 .071 .035 .091
industry5 .152 .165 .071 .167 .182
industry6 .227 .237 .357 .236 .273
industry7 .311 .302 .214 .347 .242
frmsize1 .236 .259 .429 .16 .182
frmsize2 .461 .458 .5 .528 .455
frmsize3 .133 .116 0 .125 .182
Continued on next page...
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... table 14 continued
Variable control control 25–50 PF SPST RT 25–50
frmsize4 .169 .166 .071 .188 .182
preex6 .857 .839 .857 .861 .788
preex12 .789 .767 .786 .819 .788
preex12cum 10.319 10.129 9.857 10.493 9.667
pretx1 .052 .055 .071 .063 .121
state1 .127 .128 .357 .146 .394
state2 .165 .176 0 .153 .061
state3 .217 .221 .214 .229 .333
state4 .322 .312 .071 .313 .091
state5 .169 .163 .357 .16 .121
popdens 508.681 505.011 311.301 555.184 460.436
uentry 10.345 10.395 10.5 10.833 8.758
N 1381 997 14 144 33
A.4 Results of Propensity Score Estimations and Balancing
Tests
Remark: The propensity score tables show the estimated coefficients of the probit
regressions of the conditional probability to participate in the program mentioned
in the header against the alternative of not taking part in any program in the
stratum. The estimations are carried out separately for each time window of elapsed
unemployment duration (Stratum 1, 2, and 3). Standard errors are in parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ means significant at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively, in a two–sided
test. Each probit table is followed by a table indicating how many regressors pass
the Smith/Todd (2005) balancing test at different significance levels using a cubic
and a quartic of the propensity score, respectively. Graphs with the densities of the
propensity scores are in the next subsection.
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Table 15: Propensity Score Estimates Women Practice
Firm
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
age 0.0669 (0.073) 0.0972 (0.065) 0.0615 (0.075)
age sq -0.000798 (0.00089) -0.00118 (0.00080) -0.000643 (0.00089)
married -0.221* (0.13) -0.169 (0.13)
qual l 0.254 (0.43)
qual m 0.255 (0.39)
BER2 -0.0267 (0.13) -0.0419 (0.20)
entglow 0.292 (0.55)
logearn sq 0.0298 (0.029) 0.0213 (0.018)
frmsize2 0.521*** (0.17)
frmsize3 0.457** (0.21)
state3 0.399* (0.24) 0.796** (0.36)
state4 0.337 (0.22) 0.707** (0.33) 0.840** (0.36)
state5 0.901*** (0.21) 0.779** (0.37)
BER3 married 0.193 (0.12)
preex12 -0.0887 (0.14) -0.0445 (0.16)
state1 0.801** (0.34) 1.084*** (0.37)
state35 0.870*** (0.32)
popdens 0.0436 (0.11)
popdens sq -0.0213 (0.064)
BER3 0.333* (0.19)
pearn -1.260* (0.74)
logearn 0.283 (0.19)
uentry sq -0.000311 (0.00040)
Constant -5.174*** (1.53) -5.103*** (1.36) -3.966** (1.56)
Observations 5820 3906 2342
PseudoR2 0.0977 0.0397 0.0685
Table 17: Propensity Score Estimates Women SPST
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
a3034 0.0240 (0.11) 0.123 (0.098) 0.247** (0.11)
a3539 0.482* (0.26) 0.107 (0.10) -0.0693 (0.14)
a4044 0.523** (0.26) -0.0184 (0.10) 0.0334 (0.14)
a4549 0.124 (0.30) -0.223* (0.12) 0.0154 (0.14)
a5055 0.154 (0.30) -0.310*** (0.10) -0.288** (0.13)
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married -0.00535 (0.063) 0.0481 (0.059) -0.225** (0.11)
qual l -0.178* (0.10) -0.0439 (0.084) -0.199** (0.085)
BER2 -0.313*** (0.089) -0.0569 (0.088) -0.0701 (0.086)
BER3 -0.0116 (0.087) 0.250*** (0.089) 0.0820 (0.094)
logearn sq 0.0529*** (0.012)
earncens 0.510 (0.51) 0.842 (0.68) 0.822 (0.70)
state1 -0.0397 (0.094) -0.184* (0.10)
state2 -0.248** (0.098) 0.0280 (0.091)
state3 -0.0977 (0.085) -0.282*** (0.088)
state5 -0.152* (0.091) -0.214** (0.092)
uentry -0.0546*** (0.015) 0.113*** (0.017)
uentry sq 0.00324*** (0.00063) -0.00339*** (0.00069)
preex12 0.652*** (0.21)
preex12 a3544 -0.607** (0.29)
preex12 a4555 -0.748** (0.35)
preex12cum sq -0.0601 (0.071) 0.0410*** (0.015) 0.0333 (0.041)
preex12cum sq a3544 0.0320 (0.095)
preex12cum sq a4555 0.318*** (0.10)
preex12cum -0.244* (0.15) 0.168** (0.076)
preex12cum a3544 0.132 (0.20)
preex12cum a4555 0.636*** (0.24)
pretx1 -0.453*** (0.16) -0.286** (0.13) 0.333*** (0.12)
qual h 0.227* (0.13) -0.276 (0.17)
pearn -1.080*** (0.40) -0.765* (0.43)
logearn 0.350*** (0.10) 0.307*** (0.11)
industry3 0.364** (0.15) -0.153 (0.15)
industry4 0.0907 (0.16) 0.117 (0.14)
industry5 -0.149 (0.20) -0.102 (0.18)
industry67 0.112 (0.11)
industry6 0.0405 (0.11)
industry7 -0.175* (0.10)
frmsize2 0.247*** (0.087)
frmsize3 0.259** (0.11)
frmsize4 0.179* (0.11)
popdens 0.0718 (0.063)
popdens sq 0.00989 (0.037)
married a3544 0.318** (0.16)
married a4555 0.271* (0.15)
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Constant -2.601*** (0.25) -2.445*** (0.24) -1.346*** (0.25)
Observations 6037 4229 2729
PseudoR2 0.0742 0.0807 0.0550
Table 19: Propensity Score Estimates Women RT
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
a2529 0.597*** (0.18) 1.106*** (0.37)
a3034 0.404** (0.18) 1.206*** (0.36)
a3539 0.0882 (0.21) 0.942** (0.37)
a4044 0.0421 (0.21) 0.818** (0.38)
married 0.377*** (0.12) 0.172 (0.11) -0.0573 (0.14)
qual l -0.159 (0.17) -0.116 (0.16) -0.731** (0.29)
qual h -0.0540 (0.25) -0.307 (0.32)
BER2 0.0616 (0.15) 0.592** (0.29)
BER3 -0.100 (0.17) 0.542* (0.30)
earn 0.0106** (0.0042) 0.0110*** (0.0038)
preex12cum 0.142** (0.064) 0.263* (0.14)
state1 0.211 (0.18)
state24 0.375*** (0.12)
uentry -0.0989*** (0.025) 0.133*** (0.033) -0.0368*** (0.013)
uentry sq 0.00431*** (0.0011) -0.00510*** (0.0014)
age 0.120 (0.10)
age sq -0.00243* (0.0015)
preex12cum sq 0.159* (0.082)
preex12cum sq a2539 -0.112* (0.066)
state2 -0.304* (0.18) -0.575** (0.26)
state3 -0.417** (0.18) -0.352 (0.22)
state4 -0.103 (0.15) -0.448** (0.22)
state5 -0.446** (0.19) -0.150 (0.21)
logearn sq 0.0538** (0.026)
frmsize4 0.376 (0.23)
frmsize4 uentry 0.00685 (0.022)
Constant -3.083*** (0.29) -4.104** (1.79) -3.394*** (0.56)
Observations 4713 3071 1724
PseudoR2 0.0950 0.117 0.162
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Table 16: Balancing Tests Women Practice Firm
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 10 11 13 13
1 4 12 12 13 13
2 3 9 9 10 10
2 4 9 10 10 10
3 3 8 10 13 13
3 4 7 11 13 13
Table 18: Balancing Tests Women SPST
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 23 24 26 27
1 4 23 24 27 27
2 3 20 20 21 21
2 4 19 21 21 21
3 3 29 29 32 32
3 4 30 31 32 32
Table 20: Balancing Tests Women RT
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 13 14 14 15
1 4 9 10 14 15
2 3 14 14 15 15
2 4 11 13 15 15
3 3 14 14 16 16
3 4 14 15 16 16
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Table 21: Propensity Score Estimates Men Practice
Firm
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1
age 0.0515 (0.067)
age sq -0.000821 (0.00085)
BER3 -0.231 (0.21)
earn -0.00313 (0.0050)
frmsize4 0.419*** (0.14)
state1 0.447** (0.18)
state3 0.490*** (0.16)
state5 0.363** (0.18)
uentry 0.0181 (0.030)
uentry sq -0.00119 (0.0013)
Constant -3.367*** (1.28)
Observations 5598
PseudoR2 0.0663
Table 22: Balancing Tests Men Practice Firm
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 9 9 9 10
1 4 7 8 10 10
Table 23: Propensity Score Estimates Men SPST
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
a2529 0.225 (0.15)
a3034 4044 0.476*** (0.10)
a3539 0.318** (0.15) 0.254 (0.19)
a4549 0.307** (0.12) -0.334 (0.26) 0.0794 (0.22)
married 0.133* (0.069) -0.0324 (0.087) -0.105 (0.097)
qual l -0.0892 (0.11) 0.0145 (0.11) 0.292 (0.22)
qual h 0.470*** (0.12) -0.104 (0.17) 0.438*** (0.16)
BER3 0.152 (0.096) 0.429* (0.24) 0.0447 (0.22)
logearn 0.128 (0.093) 0.0582 (0.096)
earncens 0.541 (0.43) 0.0931 (0.49)
industry6 0.0362 (0.088)
industry57 -0.208*** (0.078)
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frmsize2 0.163* (0.088) 0.275** (0.12)
frmsize3 0.148 (0.12) 0.154 (0.17)
frmsize4 0.356*** (0.11) 0.193 (0.15)
preex12 0.183 (0.12) -0.136 (0.12)
preex12cum sq 0.0195 (0.026) 0.0434 (0.033)
preex12 a4055 0.124 (0.10)
popdens 0.203*** (0.064)
popdens sq -0.104** (0.042)
uentry -0.0176 (0.016) 0.0954*** (0.026)
uentry sq 0.00145** (0.00068) -0.00260*** (0.00100)
a3039 0.000506 (0.14)
a4044 0.233 (0.15) 0.266 (0.20)
a5055 -0.674** (0.27) 0.227 (0.19)
BER2 0.0651 (0.22) -0.133 (0.21)
preex12 a4555 0.529** (0.26)
a3034 0.139 (0.18)
qual l a3544 -0.547* (0.33)
qual l a4555 -0.291 (0.29)
preex12cum sq a4055 -0.123** (0.061)
Constant -3.019*** (0.39) -2.551*** (0.42) -1.603*** (0.27)
Observations 5758 2846 1525
PseudoR2 0.0807 0.0567 0.0353
Table 24: Balancing Tests Men SPST
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 17 20 22 22
1 4 17 20 22 22
2 3 14 14 15 15
2 4 11 13 15 15
3 3 15 15 17 17
3 4 13 14 17 17
Table 25: Propensity Score Estimates Men RT
COEFFICIENT Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
a2529 0.970*** (0.24) 0.843*** (0.22)
a3034 1.034*** (0.24) 0.683*** (0.22)
a3539 0.840*** (0.24) 0.684*** (0.22)
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a4044 0.651*** (0.25) 0.499** (0.22)
married 0.0561 (0.090) 0.0817 (0.11) 0.00675 (0.18)
qual l -0.174 (0.14) -0.193 (0.27) -0.179 (0.23)
qual h -0.604* (0.35) -0.244 (0.43)
logearn 0.0752 (0.092) 0.106 (0.15)
frmsize2 0.325*** (0.12)
frmsize3 0.377** (0.16)
frmsize4 0.511*** (0.15)
preex12 -0.303* (0.17) 0.213 (0.22)
preex12cum 0.352*** (0.13)
preex12cum sq 0.124** (0.056) -0.0654* (0.038)
state1 0.0417 (0.13) 1.031*** (0.27)
state2 -0.0132 (0.14) 0.0906 (0.36)
state3 0.0538 (0.12) 0.716*** (0.27)
state5 -0.290** (0.15) 0.380 (0.31)
popdens 0.250*** (0.089)
popdens sq -0.192*** (0.066)
uentry 0.00237 (0.0062) 0.0428 (0.029)
qual m -0.260 (0.24)
BER2 0.322 (0.41)
BER3 0.140 (0.43)
logearn sq 0.0196 (0.019)
uentry sq -0.00240* (0.0013)
age -0.0502 (0.13)
age sq 0.000270 (0.0017)
pretx1 0.530* (0.30)
Constant -3.085*** (0.44) -2.761*** (0.56) -1.474 (2.35)
Observations 4551 2125 1030
PseudoR2 0.0814 0.0509 0.118
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Table 26: Balancing Tests Men RT
Stratum Degree of P-values Regressors
Polynominal >.10 >.05 >.01
1 3 17 18 21 21
1 4 19 21 21 21
2 3 11 13 13 13
2 4 11 11 13 13
3 3 10 11 12 12
3 4 7 9 12 12
A.5 Common Support
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B Information about the data
B.1 Other types of further training
In this study we are interested in active labor market programs for unemployed who
have previously been employed and who have not already found a new job. However,
we also want to give a short overview about other programs regulated by the labor
promotion act (AFG) which we do not evaluate.
German Courses
The German Courses are intended for newly arrived immigrants. So the participants
typically have not been employed in Germany before the German Course and hence
are not part of the focus group of this study, the previously employed unemployed.
Career Advancement
These programs are typical programs directed at the employed, which were more
important when the labor promotion act was introduced in 1969. By providing
additional human capital the participant’s risk of becoming unemployed should be
lowered. Prime examples are courses in which the participants with a vocational
training degree obtain additional certificates which allow them to independently run
craftsman’s establishments and to train trainees in the dual system of vocational
training.
Wage subsidies
Wage subsidies are paid for the employment of formerly long-term unemployed and
are intended to decrease the competitive disadvantage of these recruits for the period
of familiarization with the skill requirement of the job. Even if the target group of
wage subsidies are also unemployed we do not evaluate them because they require
a job for which the wage subsidy is paid. This means provision of wage subsidies
is already conditional on employment which is the success criteria for the other
programs.
Any program which starts together with a job
For the same reasons why we do not evaluate wage subsidies we also do not evaluate
any program which starts together with employment. Because we want to evalu-
ate the program’s effect on employment we do not consider programs which start
together with employment.
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B.2 Construction of the monthly panel
The IABS employment and LED benefit payment data are daily register data
whereas the FuU training data gives monthly information about program partic-
ipation. This study uses the merged data as described in Bender et al. (2005).
From the merged data we construct a monthly panel. If the original daily data con-
tain more than one spell overlapping a specific month we take the information from
the spell with the largest overlap as the spell defining the monthly information.
The defining condition to be part of our inflow sample into unemployment is a tran-
sition from an employment month to a nonemployment month, in which the last
employment month was between December 1992 and November 1993 and thus the
first unemployment month was between January 1993 and December 1994. In order
to divide nonemployment (to be precise: not employed subject to social security
contributions) into unemployment and other states (like labor market leavers, tran-
sition into self employment, employment as civil servant) we additionally require
a month with benefit payments from the employment office within the first twelve
month of nonemployment or indication of participation in any labor market program
in one of our data to be part of the inflow sample in unemployment.
Later on we aggregate the information further from monthly to quarterly informa-
tion. Whereas the monthly employment information is binary the quarterly employ-
ment information can take the values 0, 1/3, 2/3 or 1.
We identify program participation if a person starts a program while being in the
defining unemployment spell. The participant must not be employed in in the first
month of the program. Otherwise we would consider such a program as a program
which starts together with a job which we do not evaluate. In this case we would
treat such a person as being employed. The exact identification of the program
types will be explained in the following.
B.3 Identifying program participation
We identify participation in a further training program from a combination of FuU
training data information, the benefit payment information and the employment
status information. In principle, every participant in a further training program
should be recorded in the FuU training data and we would not need the benefit
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payment data for identification of participation. There are two reasons to use the
benfit payment data as well. First we find the training data to be incomplete, many
recipients of training related benefits are not contained in the training data.13 Only
using the benefit payment data identifies these participants. Second, quite often the
type of training in the training data is given very unspecific as “Other adjustment
of working skills”. The benefit payment data can give more information about these
programs. Finally we need the employment status to identify participation because
we only evaluate programs which start while being unemployed.
In the remaining part of this section we describe how we aggregate the benefit
payment information and the training data information. The next section contains
the exact coding plan. We disclose in detail which combination of information from
benefit payment and training data we identify as PF, SPST or RT.14
Benefit payment information from the LED-data
The merged data we use contain three variables with benefit payment information
from the original LED data, (”parallel original benefit information 1-3” [Leistungsart
im Original 1-3 ] L1LA1, L2LA1, L3LA1). The main variable is L1LA1. If there
are two parallel payment informations in the original data L1LA2 also contains in-
formation and only if there is a third parallel payment spell L3LA1 is also filled. In
general we use L1LA1. Only if L1LA1 is not informative about program participa-
tion and L2LA1 is we use L2LA1 and only if L1LA1 and L2LA1 are not informative
but L3LA1 we use L3LA1. The benefit payment information is given in time vary-
ing three-digit codes (for the coding plan see Bender et al. 2005). We extracted
the program related information from the benefit payment information as given in
table 27. The main distinction regarding program participation is the distinction
between no benefits at all or unemployment benefits/assistance on the one hand and
program related maintenance benefits on the other hand. There are five types of
program related benefits. Most important for us are the more general maintenance
benefits while in further training and the more specific maintenance benefits while
in retraining.
13Remember the purpose of the training data was only internal documentation. This might
explain its incompleteness.
14More details about the benefit payment data and training data can be found in Speckesser
(2004), Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) and Bender et al. (2005).
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Table 27: Aggregated types of benefit payment
German Abbreviation Description
ALG unemployment benefits
ALHi unemployment assistance
UHG §41a maintenance payment while in specific short term measure
UHG Fortbildung maintenance payment while in further training
UHG Umschulung maintenance payment while in retraining
UHG Darlehen maintenance payment as a loan
UHG Deutsch maintenance payment while in a German course
The original benefit payment information is given in three variables L1LA1, L2LA1 and L3LA1
with time varying three-digit codes.
Type of training from FuU-data
In this evaluation study one of the most important advantages compared to survey
data is the information about the precise type of training. It allows us to identify
homogeneous treatments for the evaluation. In the merging process, up to two
parallel FuU-spells were merged to one spell of the IABS data because in many
cases the FuU-data provided more than one parallel spell. These two parallel spells
provide two variables indicating the type of course (Maßnahmeart [FMASART1,
FMASART2]).
Aggregating the training type information Since type of treatment (Maß-
nahmeart) is often coded as “other adjustment”
(FMASART1=12 [Sonstige Anpassungen]) in the FuU-data, we increase the preci-
sion of information about the type of treatment by relying on the second parallel
information about the type of training: The second FuU-spell is used if the first
FuU-spell is coded as “other adjustment” (”Sonstige Anpassungen”) and a second
spell includes a code different from 12. Such combined information of FMASART1
and FMASART2 is referred to as FMASART* in the following.
Combining the information
When using information from different sources, the sources may give differing infor-
mation. If the training data indicated training participation and the benefit payment
data did not or vice versa we relied on the source which indicated training for the
following reasons. If somebody receives training related benefits it is more likely that
the employment agency forgot to fill in the training data record than the agency
60
wrongly induced payment of benefits. And if somebody is contained in the training
data but does not receive maintenance benefits he either receives no benefits, which
is possible while being in training, or receives unemployment benefits/assistance and
the payment is just wrongly labelled.
If both training and benefit payment data indicate program participation but differ
in the type of program we generally use the training data information. An exam-
ple: the benefit payment indicates maintenance payments for further training and
the training data indicates Retraining. We use Retraining from the training data.
The only exception is unspecific program information from the training data “other
adjustment”. If in such cases the benefit payment data give specific information
like Retraining we use the information from benefit payment data. All possible
combinations of training and benefit payment information which we use to identifiy
participation in one of the three programs are given in the following section.
B.4 Coding plan for the treatment information
This section gives the exact coding plans for identification of Practice Firm, SPST
and Retraining. In general we identify program participation as start of a program
in an unemployment spell before another employment begins. This means that we
only identify a start of a program if the employment status in the first month of the
program indicates no employment (BTYP 6=1).
Practice Firm
Practice Firm is a consolidation of the program types Practice enterprise and Prac-
tice studio from the FuU training data. There is no specific benefit payment type
related to Practice Firms, rather the participants shall receive the general main-
tenance payment for further training. Since the training data are more reliable
than the benefit payment data regarding type of the program we identify Practice
Firm whenever FMASART shows the codes 11 or 12 independently of the payment
information.
Program code Label Label in German
10 Practice enterprise U¨bungsfirma
11 Practice studio U¨bungswerkstatt
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In table 28 we show how often which combination of benefit payment information
and program type information identifies Practice Firm in the two inflow samples.
Table 28: Identification of Practice Firm with program type and benefit payment
type: Frequencies
Type of payment
no benefits UB/UA maintenance benefits for
short term further retraining
Program training training Total
Practice enterprise 0 0 0 106 0 106
Practice studio 0 0 0 110 2 112
Total 0 0 0 216 2 218
Women and Men together. BTYP 6=1 as an additional requirement.
Provision of specific professional skills and techniques
We identify SPST in the following cases.
(a) Identification from training data and benefit payment data
We identify SPST if the training data indicates the general program “Other
adjustment” and the benefit payment information is no benefit payments,
unemployment benefits, unemployment assistance or maintenance payments
while in retraining.
Program
code
Label Label in German
12 Other adjustment of working skills sonst. Anpassung der berufl. Ken-
ntnisse
(b) Reliance on benefit payment data
We identify SPST if the program information from the training data is missing
and the benefit payment information is maintenance payments while in further
training.
Program
code
Label Label in German
-9 missing fehlende Angabe
(c) Additional program from training data
We also identify SPST when another program of little quantitative importance
but SPST–comparable content is recorded in the training data independent of
the benefit payment information.
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Program
code
Label Label in German
31 Further education of trainers and
multidisciplinary qualification
Heran-/Fortbildung v. Aus-
bildungskra¨ften/ berufs-
feldu¨bergreifende Qualifikation
(d) Additional combinatioin
Finally we identify SPST if the training data indicate the unspecific “other
career advancement” and the benefit payment information indicates further
training.
Program
code
Label Label in German
28 Other promotion sonstiger Aufstieg (< 97)
In table 29 we show how often which combination of benefit payment information
and program type information identifies SPST in the two inflow samples.
Table 29: Identification of SPST with program type and benefit payment type:
Frequencies
Type of payment
no benefits UB/UA maintenance
benefits for
Program further training Total
missing 0 0 549 549
Other adjustment of working skills 6 10 1158 1174
Other promotion 0 0 6 6
Further education of trainers and
multidisciplinary qualification 0 0 9 9
Total 6 10 1722 1738
Women and Men together. BTYP 6=1 as an additional requirement.
Retraining
Retraining or longer ”Qualification for the first labor market via the education sys-
tem” is taking part in a new vocational training and obtaining a new vocational
training degree according to the German dual education system. Additionally, but
quantitatively of little importance we see the make up of a missed examination “Cer-
tification” as comparable to retraining because the result is the same. Furthermore
and also only of marginal importance we see participation in the programs “Tech-
nican” or “Master of Business administration (not comparable to an american style
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MBA)” while not receiving maintenance benefits as a loan as Retraining. Conven-
tionally these two programs are considered as career advancement programs which
we do not evaluate. Benefits as a loan would underline their character as career
advancements.
(a) Identification from training data
We identify the following two programs as Retraining independent of the ben-
efit payment information.
Program
code
Label Label in German
29 Certification berufl. Abschlusspru¨fung
32 Retraining Umschulung
(b) Reliance on benefit payment data
If the training data is uninformative and maintenance benefits for Retraining
are paid we identify Retraining.
Program
code
Label Label in German
-9 missing fehlende Angabe
12 Other adjustment of working skills sonst. Anpassung der berufl. Ken-
ntnisse
(c) Other programs from training data
Two other programs are identified from the training data. They typically also
take two years full time and require an existing vocational training degree,
hence are somewhat comparable to retraining in a narrower definition. Not
identified if maintenance benefits are paid as a loan.
Program
code
Label Label in German
26 Technician Techniker (<97)
27 Master of business administration Betriebswirt (<97)
In table 30 we show how often which combination of benefit payment information
and program type information identifies Retraining in the two inflow samples.
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Table 30: Identification of Retraining with program type and benefit payment type:
Frequencies
Type of payment
no benefits UB/UA maintenance benefits
Program further training retraining loan Total
missing 0 0 0 55 0 55
Other adjustment of
working skills 0 0 0 13 0 13
Technician 0 0 0 0 0 0
Master of business
administration 0 0 0 0 0 0
Certification 0 0 1 0 0 1
Retraining 2 2 219 137 0 360
Total 2 2 220 205 0 429
Women and Men together. BTYP 6=1 as an additional requirement.
65
B.5 Sample construction in comparison to LMW
Table 31: Overview sample construction
this paper LMW
Inflow sample starts unemployment spell in
93/94
starts unemployment spell in
93/94
Treatment group starts a program within 24
months after beginning of un-
employment spell
starts a program between begin-
ning of unemployment spell and
the end of 94
Control group dynamic control group: does
not start a program in the stra-
tum of unemployment under
consideration
static control group: does not
start a program between begin-
ning of unemployment spell and
the end of 94
Treatment identi-
fication
training spell in the training
participation data or income
maintenance spell in the bene-
fit payment data indicating pro-
gram participation
training spell in the training
participation data
Age restriction 25–55 years (25–50 in case of
RT) in the year of entry into un-
employment
20–53 years in the year of the
(simulated) program start
Benefit payment
restriction
controls have to receive unem-
ployment benefits at least once
during the first 12 months of
their unemployment spell
recipience of benefits in the
month before program start for
participants and in the month
before as well as in the month
of the simulated program start
for controls
Other restrictions without East Berlin last employment before defin-
ing unemployment spell not as
trainee, home worker, appren-
tice, or in part-time with less
than half of the usual ours; no
foreigners
Sample size RT Women: 189 (=61+75+53),
Men: 219 (=107+79+33), num-
bers in parenthesis differenti-
ated by strata
Women: 190, Men: 255
Sample size SPST
(this paper) and
short and long
training (LMW)
Women: 1063
(=254+374+435), Men: 485
(=200+141+144)
Women: 557 (=209 (short)
+ 348 (long)), Men: 302
(=112+190)
Sample size non-
participants
Women: 4585, Men: 5076 (not
directly comparable to the dy-
namic control groups used in
the paper)
Women: 2914, Men: 1690
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C Heterogeneous Treatment Effects by Target
Profession
C.1 Retraining for Men
In this section we show heterogeneous treatment effects of retraining on men. We
contrast retraining (RT) with target profession in construction with RT with other
target profession (non-construction).
The effects are estimated in the same way as the non-disaggregated effects in the
paper. We used the same propensity score specifications and bandwidth as in the
paper.
Table 32: Sample sizes: Retraining for men by target profession
Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3
Construction 40 29 19
Non-construction 50 40 13
missing 17 10 1
Total 107 79 33
Remark: The participants are classified according to the field in which they are retrained.
This information is only available from the training participation data and hence is missing
if participation is identified from the benefit payment data.
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